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Abstract: In recent times, reflections on the institution of dismissal have focused almost exclu-
sively on understandings of employment protection as a cost for the employer and on the supposed nega-
tive effects of these costs for net employment creation. These approaches –more or less favourable to the 
regulatory intervention of the State– are usually in debt to the paradigm that sees labor law as consisting 
of a number of restrictions on the “free” market established in order address certain social issues.
This paradigm is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. For that reason this work aims to start 
from a different approach. Certainly, labor law isn’t an element disconnected from the labor market that 
distorts the “pure” interaction between the supply of and demand for labor, but it plays, amongst others, 
a role in forming that market. Market construction, in terms of maximization of its social effectiveness, 
is carried out through a re-balancing of power between employees and employers which requires the 
empowerment of workers. The “protection” of workers is not an end in itself, but rather a tool to provide 
them with power in the context of unequal relations of production. 
Taking these distinct approaches as a starting point, this article argues that dismissal is the main 
institution through which the legislator’s intervention may have a significant impact on the power re-
lationship between the parties. Hence it is the cornerstone of labor law, determining its entire effective 
application and, therefore, the mobilization of rights ‘in the shadow of the law’ in the day by day of em-
ployment relations. This article identifies the elements that dismissal regulation should have in order to 
be effective, offering at the same time a global critique of the Spanish model of employment protection, 
with special consideration to the alterations suffered under the Labor Reform of 2012.
Keywords: Employment protection legislation, mobilisation of worker rights, effectiveness of 
labor law.
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1. Labor law and the “empowerment” of workers
In recent times, theoretical approaches regarding dismissal regulation and so-called “labor re-
forms” have been focused fundamentally on the perspective of considering that employment protection 
legislation provides job security to the worker but implies a labor cost to the employers. Thus, it is 
claimed that the legal mechanisms of employment protection involve “excessive” costs for enterprises 
that hinder employment creation, make it difficult to manage human resources adequately or reproduce 
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labour market segmentation. The academic debate may and must address seriously this question in order 
to move beyond the mere expression of ideological prejudices. In my judgement, the emphasis that is 
placed on these aspects obviates some issues of transcendental importance.
This is a consequence of the fact that law in general and labor law in particular end up being con-
templated from a perspective originating in the prevailing discourse in economics. This perspective is 
not worthless, but neither does it describe reality in a totally precise way. Most economists tend to con-
sider law a set of restrictions –more or less appropriate– on the “free” interaction between “supply” and 
“demand” in markets, which are ideally conceived as spontaneous and self-organising orders. Although 
this perspective assumes a moderate position, accepting the necessity of a certain level of regulation, the 
intervention of law is contemplated as the intervention of State’s power over an economic order ideally 
conceived as a reality perfectly separated from legal regulations and the rest of society. This dissociation 
is brought about to a large extent by academic specialization. In the actual context of workers’ weakness 
in the balance of power between capital and labor, this cognitive framework often causes “markets” to 
be seen as idealised and almost personified entities that do not depend on human behaviour, thus making 
law, by the very nature of things, “invasive” regulation.
This view of the legal system as a set of restrictions on the interaction of supply and demand in 
the “free” market seems to be of some usefulness, but it is incomplete if accepted in absolute terms. 
Indeed, the “market” is a contingent institution, which does not exist in all known human societies and 
that only since industrialisation (and through the intensive activity of State’s power) has turned into 
the essential basis of human subsistence1. “Supply” and “demand” do not emerge ex nihilo, but rather 
spring up from social life, as a result of the intervention of various social actors with different degrees 
of power and influence; among these actors, the State plays a leading role. Thus, in real terms, law not 
only imposes restrictions on markets but also performs a fundamental role in their creation, configura-
tion and maintenance2.
Opposing this limited, economistic perspective, some academics have stressed the role of labor 
law in the creation, configuration and maintenance of labour markets. Among them we want to empha-
size the approach of Deakin and Wilkinson3. These authors consider that the redistributing and protec-
tive roles of labor law have a positive function in the configuration of the labor market, as they correct 
inherent problems attached to unregulated markets and therefore promote greater social utility. So, for 
example, protection against dismissal of pregnant workers constitute a substantive freedom that permits 
effective integration of women into the labour market. This idea is combined with the concept of “ca-
pabilities,” borrowed from the economist Amartya Sen, so that social rights are interpreted as “institu-
tionalised forms of capabilities which provide individuals with the means to realise the potential of their 
resource endowments and thereby achieve a higher level of economic functioning”4.
In my opinion, this theory has some limitations, principally as a result of its rhetorical function; 
since it is a question of convincing the reader that labor law and labor market are not opponents but 
rather complements, much emphasis is placed on considering law from an almost exclusively economic 
perspective. In my opinion, the view of law as an instrument for the configuration of markets and for the 
maximization of economic efficiency must be complemented with the consideration of other aspects of 
a legal, sociological or political nature. Thus, on the one hand, it should not be forgotten that labor law 
and social security law have the purpose of channelling social conflicts (what, of course, will probably 
benefit economic effectiveness and, where appropriate, productivity). On the other hand, analysis of 
legal reality should not fail to take political values into account and, in particular, the value of democ-
racy; a legal system will be more democratic in so far as it involves greater controls on power. In this 
sense, labor law will be more democratic in so far as the channels it promotes to guide the resolution of 
1 Polanyi, K., The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, 2nd edition, Beacon Paperback ed., 
Boston, MA: Beacon, 2011.
2 I have already defended this argument in the article “La regulación de las migraciones laborales en tiempos de crisis”, El 
Cronista del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, nº 2, pp. 34-35.
3 Deakin, S. Wilkinson, F., The law of the labour market: industrialisation, employment and legal evolution, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005.
4 Ibid., p.347.
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conflicts permit an effective limiting of the power exerted by the employer, and which is inherent in the 
capitalist mode of production5.
In any case, what I find more relevant from the approach of these authors is that they empha-
size –although using other language– the empowerment of workers more than the protection of work-
ers as an absolute value. The notion of “protection” could even be seen as paternalistic in nature, 
insofar as it considers workers as playing a passive role in defending their own interests. The key to 
channeling social conflict in order to democratize (within the inherent limits of the capitalist system) 
salaried work relationships and to maximize labor market efficiency is the re-balancing of power in 
the context of industrial relations in order to allow workers to defend personally and collectively their 
interests and to operate as autonomous and free individuals in the market and in the society. In this 
context, workers’ “protection” may be important, but it is a means to carry out this re-balancing of 
powers rather than an end in itself.
2. Everyday mobilization of labor rights
Law is a social sub-system functionally specialised in the channelling of conflicts that operates 
through the generalisation of expectations6. The legal system provides solutions or predetermined reso-
lution schemes for conflicts that could hypothetically arise, therefore enabling conflicting parties to 
adjust their expectations toward these solutions. 
In abstract terms, there can be several reasons for conflicting people to comply with the solutions 
provided by the legal system. The most obvious reason for them to abide by the rules is the eventuality 
of coercion; parties can impose on their opponents the solutions established in the legal system through 
resort to the State’s power, which seeks to have a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence and 
exerts that monopoly in a relative –if not absolutely– credible way.7 If the coercion mechanisms are ef-
fective, they do not have to be exerted directly; rather, they operate indirectly, as the recipients of the 
rule anticipate the possibility of the imposition of solutions, or seek to avoid the performance of the 
expected sanctions, and thus comply with the rule spontaneously in their daily life without the need for 
formal state intervention. Beyond coercion, in certain contexts legal rules are complied with due to the 
need to achieve a minimum of security in social and economic relations; people need to know what they 
should be doing in their dealings with others and legal regulation can provide them with some certainty, 
although it may also compete in this regard with another normative systems alien to the State’s power. 
Finally, sometimes norms are obeyed either because they have been internalized, that is, because the 
social players have assumed them within their own discourses and not as external orders, or because the 
issuing authority enjoys a certain degree of legitimacy in the community.8
In spite of the above observations, it is evident that in certain social contexts the failure to 
comply with rules is rather widespread and it goes far beyond that the emergence of isolated and 
occasional deviant behaviour. In effect, legal rules are not the only reasons for action, or the only 
schemes that attribute meaning to human behaviour; rather, they are competitors in the social space 
with other regulatory systems and with other motivations, desires and interests on the part of individu-
als or social groups. 
5 In this vein, linking protection against dismissal with democratic values, Baylos Grau, A., Pérez rey, J., El despido o la 
violencia del poder privado, Trotta, Madrid, 2009, pp. 46-50. This entire monograph constitutes an important reference to the 
theme addressed in the present article.
6 This definition is built through Luhman and Teubner’s theories which represent law as an “autopoietic” system. I think 
these theories are very suggestive and can contribute some interesting ideas, but this doesn’t mean that I have assumed them 
with all their consequences; particularly, I consider problematic the emphasis that has been placed on the autonomy of systems, 
which could lead to an excessive idealisation of certain aspects of social reality that only should be viewed apart from the rest 
for analytical purposes.
7 WeBer, M., Economía y sociedad: esbozo de sociología comprensiva,  Fondo de Cultura Económica España, Madrid, 
1993 [1922]
8 See my discussion on the efficacy of employment law in “Una aproximación metodológica al problema de la eficacia de 
las normas laborales”, Revista de Derecho Social, nº 59, 2012, pp. 76-83.
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Specifically, it must not be assumed that labor rights are brought to bear automatically because 
they have been formulated in the rules. These rights must be mobilized individually by right-holders 
(individual and collective actors), not only in the most critical moments of open conflict demonstration 
but also in the daily performance of the employment relationship9. The mobilization of rights not only 
occurs when social actors make recourse to institutional mechanisms of coercion, but also when con-
flicting parties refer to the law as a tool (among others) to strengthen their position in the course of the 
bargaining process and everyday contexts of employment relations. Certainly, when employees consider 
that their interests are protected by rules, they may feel especially legitimated to put pressure on the 
employer in defence of those interests10.
In any case, beyond this “moral” motivation, the effective binding of rights depends in the last 
resort on the context of power relationships within the enterprise11. If power relations are highly biased 
towards the employer, the formal recognition of social rights lacks importance. At the same time, how-
ever, as was pointed out previously, well-designed and well-implemented labor regulations are able to 
produce a certain re-balancing of powers. Therefore, the efficacy (or ineffectiveness) of labor regula-
tions with respect to the “empowerment” of workers is self-reinforcing. This means that the more bal-
anced the powers are, the easier it will be for the labor precepts that contribute to this balance to be 
applied while, in so far as labor legislation is not able to achieve this empowerment effect, it will make 
the performance of other labour precepts more difficult, thereby amplifying the dysfunction.
For this reason, it appears appropriate to identify the essential parameters that determine to a 
great extent the relations of power between the parties. Insofar as labor legislation manages to impact 
these parameters, there will be a positive feedback effect, which will influence the efficacy of the entire 
system. In my opinion, these parameters are principally the following12:
—   The capacity of employees to organize and the relative power of their collective avenues of 
representation. This parameter depends mostly on social, historical and economic factors, 
although it may be influenced considerably by the institutional framework designed by norms.
—   The effective functioning of the mechanisms of protection provided by the legal system. This 
parameter depends nearly exclusively on institutional and legal factors, as it refers to the ac-
cessibility of institutional procedures for the protection of rights, as well as to the efficacy of 
these procedures and to the sanctions and remedies foreseen by the legal system. In any event, 
it should be taken into account that protection and coercion procedures usually require that 
recipients mobilize labor rights for themselves, either individually or collectively, and this is 
not always going to be easy if power relations are unbalanced.
—   The global cost of the termination and replacement of workers. This parameter is at the same 
time made up of two elements: the economic and bureaucratic costs of a possible dismissal 
and the costs to replace the worker. The first of these elements depends almost exclusively 
on institutional and statutory factors, while the second is mainly connected to the worker’s 
qualifications (officially recognised or not), the job requirements and the characteristics of the 
available labour force.
9 In this regard Vid. alBiston, C.R. “Bargaining in the shadow of social institutions: competing discourses and social 
change in workplace mobilisation of civil rights”, Law & Society Review, Vol.39, nº 1, 2005, which combines theoretical 
reflection with an empirical examination of family leave.
10 Ibid., p. 29. This motivation is increasing through informal social interaction with family, friends, colleagues or legal 
representatives, who encourage the employee to put “his or her rights” into play (p.27); in the case of leave, the legitimation 
obtained by the recognition of interests is used as well against the possible rejection by one’s colleagues (pp. 37-38).
11 Ibid., pp. 16, 23-25.
12 Actually, although I refer to three main parameters, I consider that there exists a fourth –the “moral” legitimation of power 
structures producing labour rules and of the rules’ content. This parameter is constituted more by socio-cultural and political 
factors than by legal ones and in any case, its incidence in the context of enterprises orientated toward the maximization of 
benefits is limited. This does not imply that regulation cannot interfere with these parameters, but rather that its capacity to 
influence is limited.
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3. Particular importance of the dismissal regulation in the “empowerment” of workers
In my opinion, dismissal regulation is the most relevant legal institution in the composition of 
these parameters. This is why the dismissal regime constitutes the cornerstone of labour law,13 as a 
statutory system directed toward the channelling of social conflict and to the maximization of the social 
efficiency of the labor market through the generation of expectations an the re-balancing of power rela-
tionships between employers and workers.
Apart from the nuances that might arise in every concrete situation, the inherent power imbalance 
of employment relations in a free-market capitalist economy derives fundamentally from the fact that 
salary is the only, or at least, the main livelihood or the principal source of sustenance and welfare for 
working people, as well as the dominant path for personal and social integration. In this context, work-
ers’ fear of losing their jobs generally constitute the employer’s most important weapon in everyday em-
ployment relations. Obviously, these worries increase in a context of massive structural unemployment, 
even where sufficiently generous social benefits are able to partially mitigate this effect.
An employee whose employment stability is precarious in nature is reluctant to organise in con-
junction with other workers, to put him or herself forward in an election of representatives, to become a 
member of a labor union or to exercise collective action in the defence of his or her interests or those of 
others in similar situations. At the same time he or she is an employee who will have difficulty mobiliz-
ing individually rights recognised in the legal system through the exercise of legal actions, registering 
formal complaints to administrative bodies in charge of controlling the enforcement of labour regulations, 
or simply defending his or her interests through everyday bargaining “in the shadow of the law”, that is, 
under the legitimation of rights officially stipulated by regulation. For these reasons, dismissal regulation 
affects very significantly the three parameters that have been mentioned previously defining the power re-
lationship between the parties. Other elements affecting these parameters (business size, union traditions, 
the internalization and legitimation of norms, business culture, workers’ qualifications and labor supply 
shortages) derive to a great degree from factors that less closely linked to the content of legal norms.
It should also be noted that in most cases the termination of the employment contract is the final 
cost for a poorly resolved conflict inside the enterprise. In the daily living of any productive organisation 
slighter or greater conflicts between employees and employers arise continuously. Pathological cases 
aside, this conflict is gradually channelled through permanent and daily bargaining (individual or col-
lective) in which the parties give way or gain footing according to their power relations. In this context, 
the typical scenario is that the possibility of termination (both at the initiative of the employee as well 
as at the initiative of the employer) is always present, implicitly or explicitly, and determines decisively 
the equilibrium of power. Both the employers’ representatives and employees know that if conflicts are 
not adequately resolved, they become amplified, with the final result often being that the employee is 
separated from the business. Therefore, the higher the cost of termination, the greater the employee’s 
power in these everyday situations and, thus, the greater the employer’s incentives to find channels for 
resolving such conflicts peacefully and, critically, within the business.
The importance of dismissal regulation for the equilibrium of power relations increases in the 
context of small and medium sized enterprises. In small enterprises there are structural reasons hinder-
ing both the existence of employees’ representatives and, if they do exist, their proper functioning ac-
cording to the expectations created by traditional labor unions; certainly, some partial solutions against 
this “representative deficit” could be considered, but the effects of these solutions are always going to 
be limited. Moreover, the elevated unreliability, individualization and personalization of relationships 
in the context of smaller enterprises means that formal resort to mechanisms of protection stipulated 
by the legal system is relatively limited (or completely non-existent) during the life of the employment 
relationship; in a small organisation, the fact of invoking a third party outside the firm to impose binding 
solutions often signifies a breakdown of the personal relationships that are so central to production in 
these types of firms.
13 I pursue the same idea, although with somewhat different and more developed arguments in the monograph, Vicisitudes 
y extinción de la relación de trabajo en las pequeñas empresas, CES, Madrid, 2007, pp. 329-335.
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Ideological constructions of the “flexicurity” model tend to ignore the importance of dismissal 
regulations in the empowerment of workers. The replacement of stability by the supposed improvement 
of active and passive employment policies potentially undermines the re-balancing of power between 
the employee and the employer. There is thus a very high risk that this paradigm will be utilised to le-
gitimise the deregulation of dismissal without seriously improving employment policies; in any event, 
even where the improvement is effective, some dysfunctions in power relations do occur. Undoubtedly, 
the fear of losing one’s job is less significant if good employment benefits are contemplated along with 
retraining and relocation mechanisms, but for several reasons this effect is limited.
In the first place, the efficacy of active policies depends to a high degree on the real demand for la-
bor, which is very low if unemployment is structural and massive. Secondly, passive policies are limited 
by several causes, as they cannot replace completely the role of employment even in its dimension of a 
minimum income guarantee (and far less so for more non-material aspects). In the third place, beyond 
the worker’s “fear” of losing his or her job, we also have to consider the influence of regulation on the 
behaviour of the opposing party. If termination is the final cost of an unresolved conflict and this cost 
is low for the employer (because the cost has been “socialised” through public spending on active and 
passive measures), then most of the incentives for managing appropriately the conflict disappear and it 
is likely that employers’ preferred strategy will rest on an elevated involuntary job rotation. Such strate-
gies of course affect productivity negatively and thus end up being counterproductive for overall social 
welfare and economic efficiency. 
Discourses about the so-called Danish “flexicurity” model tend to ignore that in Denmark there 
are remarkably high rates of union membership and that unions are well organized. Dismissal conflicts 
are generally channelled through a series of relatively efficacious conflict resolution mechanisms, so that 
the number of arbitrary dismissals is extremely reduced and the control of managerial power is carried 
out principally through union intervention14.
4. Elements for the control of managerial power in the regulation of dismissal: a general critique 
of Spanish legislation
The control of the employer’s unilateral power through dismissal regulation is based primarily on 
four factors: just cause for dismissal, dismissal procedures, the consequences associated with the failure 
to comply with legal norms and the mechanisms for protection against unlawful managerial decisions 
(along with, if relevant, judicial decisions).
The cause of dismissal is the key element for controlling management’s arbitrary power over 
industrial relations. Thus, voices associated with employer interests frequently promote –directly or 
indirectly–, some kind of deregulation of the legal requirement for just cause (for example, through the 
“single contract of employment” approach). These proposals are justified with the argument that deregu-
lation will increase employment rates. I consider this reasoning quite feeble in general and particularly 
weak in the Spanish context. In my view, this demand plays an ideological function that masks a fun-
damentally political matter: in so far as arbitrary dismissals are allowed, there will in practice not be 
any possibility to control the employer’s power within the organisation. In any case, it should be noted 
that the requirement of dismissal for justified grounds is derived directly from Article 35 of the Spanish 
Constitution (according to Constitutional jurisprudence) and Convention 158 ILO.
Logically, the stricter the regulation of just cause, the greater the power bestowed on the employee 
in everyday interest bargaining. However, “extremely” inflexible regulation that fails to suit business 
necessities could be counterproductive, as demands for flexibility would be channelled in a dysfunc-
tional way. For dismissals on disciplinary grounds or dismissals on objective grounds stemming from 
the employees’ circumstances, it is essential that the legal system demand that the grounds involved be 
significant; small offences or worker dysfunctions should not be used to disguise dismissals pursued 
in reprisal for the exercise of rights and legitimate interests or that derive from poor management of 
14 I explain this in greater detail “Informe sobre la regulación del despido en Europa”, Temas Laborales, nº 99, pp. 282-286.
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employment conflict. Regarding dismissal for economic, technical, organisational or production-related 
grounds, the degree to which the cause may be indicated may vary, but the minimum demanded would 
have to be set by the effective guarantee that the job has not been subsequently recreated.
The fact that the cause is the “key element” does not deprive any relevancy to the rest of the ele-
ments, but simply means that these are largely at the service of the justified ground requirement. In fact, 
it could be the case that a poor regulation of the remainder of the elements makes illusory the require-
ment for cause.
In the Spanish legal system, the regulation of cause had been traditionally quite restrictive; this 
rigidity was maintained or even increased by the interpretation and implementation of juridical bodies 
(although this last affirmation should be contrasted with systematic, empirical evidence). However, after 
several labor reforms undertaken in 1994, 1997, 2010 and 2012, the standard demanded for dismissal 
related to economic, technical and organisational or production-related grounds has been reduced to the 
minimum allowed by the Spanish Constitution; there is thus no obstacle to using the figure of dismissal 
for legally admissible objective grounds to adapt staff volume to productive necessities within the organi-
sation, even in contexts where enterprises are profitable. Thus, Spain can be located among those coun-
tries that, without permitting “free dismissal” on a general basis, apply a more flexible regulation to these 
causes. However, this relaxing of standards of cause has not been accompanied by an increase in guaran-
tees that extinguished positions are not replaced by other employees; in my opinion, these guarantees will 
have to be created through judicial interpretation to avoid the fraudulent use of the institution of economic 
dismissal in such a way that unlawful decisions reinforcing de facto employer power are not allowed. 
Dismissal on objective grounds with concurring circumstances related to the employee (sud-
den incapacity, justified by frequent absence, etc.) has not been much utilised by Spanish employers. 
Recently (Labour Reform of 2012) the regulation of some of these grounds has been changed on the 
employer’s side, although it is still too soon to know if this is going to involve a wider utilisation of this 
option. Regarding dismissal on disciplinary grounds, Spanish legislation has not experienced significant 
modifications since the original drafting of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Statute); nev-
ertheless, in this case the content of the law depends significantly on the judicial interpretation of each 
particular case according to the concurring circumstances, supported by the doctrine –called “Gradual-
ist”– of the Supreme Tribunal. Beyond the polemics on this question, it would be necessary to carry out 
empirical research to determine if judicial interpretation of dismissal on disciplinary grounds is today 
inclined more towards managerial flexibility or toward employment security.
 Another issue of interest is that the labour reform of 2012 has established a new contractual mo-
dality for enterprises with less than 50 employees where the termination of employment is completely 
free (requiring neither grounds nor procedural requirements) during the first year of the contractual 
relationship. During this period the prohibition of discriminatory dismissals persists formally but in all 
other cases management’s discretion is maximal. 
The regulation of dismissal procedures can meet diverse goals, but displays clear importance 
in the control of managerial power. On the one hand, the promotion of adequate procedures enables a 
certain level of dialogue between the employer and the employee or between the employer and union 
representatives that can facilitate the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, avoiding immediate re-
course to unexpected or immediate dismissals that may consolidate draconian managerial power. On the 
other hand, the communication of dismissal to the employee stating the reasons for dismissal in writing 
results is essential to ensure the possibility of a subsequent judicial control of just cause.
With regard to non-collective dismissals, the procedural demands in Spain have always been 
very poor compared to most European countries (even in comparison to countries with more flexible 
regulations). In Spain, the dismissal is effective upon its mere communication to the employee, with no 
requirement for any previous procedure granting the employee the opportunity to defend himself or to 
claim arguments against the termination decision. A notice period is not required in any case of dismissal 
on disciplinary grounds (even in the case of openly arbitrary dismissals), while in other countries it is 
always obligatory except when the worker misconduct is truly serious. Therefore, there is a historical 
tendency in the Spanish legal system for dismissal being a managerial decision that cannot be ques-
tioned until it become effective. 
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, Directive 2002/14/CE (transposed literally at this point by the 
Spanish legislator in Article 64 of the Employees’ Statute) requires dialogue with employees in order to 
reach an agreement before taking decisions that could prompt a fundamental breach of conditions in em-
ployment contracts; in my opinion, this previous consultation duty covers dismissals, although it should 
not necessarily be applied in a formal way. The effective application of this legal mandate nevertheless 
differs from the cultural standards actually dominant in the Spanish context, thereby making it difficult 
to implement. 
Spanish legislation does make obligatory the communication of the employer´s dismissal deci-
sion in writing, although there is a dysfunction about the legal consequences foreseen by the failure to 
comply with this formal requirement. For a variety of reasons, wrongful or unfair dismissal (despido 
improcedente) has been used as the normal legal channel for Spanish employers’ decision to terminate 
the employment contract (after the labor reforms, partly by inertia), even when there is a well-justified 
ground. At the same time, currently, the only sanction foreseen by failure to comply with formal re-
quirements is the wrongful qualification. Thus, when the employer is ready to acknowledge the unfair 
dismissal, either because there is not cause or because the small compensation for unfair dismissal is 
less costly than the judicial review of the cause, he or she hasn’t the slightest incentive to obey formal 
requirements, because the failure to comply does not involve any legal consequence which differs from 
the qualification of wrongful dismissal. In the same way, verbal and even unspoken dismissals are en-
couraged. In many cases, this can cause defencelessness for employees since the employee has 20 days 
to contest the dismissal from the moment that the employee receives management’s notice. Thus, an 
employee could appeal a dismissal too late because he did not adequately interpret a series of employer 
actions that subsequently could be considered by the judicial courts as indicative of the employer’s will 
to terminate the contract of employment.
With regard to collective redundancy, the Spanish tradition had an established ex ante procedure 
for administrative control that is unusual in comparative terms. After the labour reform of 2012, how-
ever, the necessity for administrative authorisation has disappeared. At this time, procedural demands 
for collective dismissals are situated broadly in the minimum established by EU Directive.
Regulation of the legal consequences for failure to comply with obligations is critical for ensur-
ing just cause in dismissal and, therefore, the effective prohibition of employers’ arbitrary actions. The 
Spanish system has explicitly chosen to free employers who use their power of termination unlawfully 
from administrative or criminal responsibility. Although in labor law many minor infractions have been 
considered to be questions of “public order” worthy of administrative sanction, in the case of dismissal, 
the only effective control is legal action by the affected worker with the objective of obtaining reinstate-
ment or compensation for the damages suffered. Administrative sanctions do exist for failures to comply 
with obligations regarding temporary employment; however, for one or another reason, these have not 
shown efficacy in preventing fraud.
Regarding the contractual consequences of unfair or wrongful dismissal, European doctrine distin-
guishes between effective protection (tutela reale in Italian), which implies reinstatement, and mandatory 
protection (tutela obbligatoria), which signifies the establishment of economic compensation. From a 
purely abstract perspective, effective protection seems a more appropriate channel for ensuring the re-
quirement of just cause for dismissal. This is why many lawyers, especially those most committed to de-
fending and advancing the interests of employees, advocate this form of protection. In practice, however, 
on numerous occasions the purity of legal principles contrasts harshly with economic and social reality, 
which makes reinstatement impossible or undesirable even for employees. For this reason, countries in 
which reinstatement is officially contemplated, frequently end up in practice converting the compulsory 
act of reinstatement into an economic compensation15; thus, the true role of ‘reinstatement’ is to reinforce 
the employee’s position in negotiations over the level of monetary compensation for dismissal.
In Spain, reinstatement is formally applicable as a general rule of the legal system, although in 
fact it is never applied, with the exception the Public Administration and perhaps in larger enterprises. 
15 I come to this conclusion in the “Informe sobre la regulación ...”, Op. Cit., p. 292 (summarising practice in different 
countries).
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With what is in my view a paternalistic perspective, our legal system conceives reinstatement as the 
most desirable option for employees (without being relevant the employee’s opinion), while at the same 
time it allows, in practice, what has come to be called “at will compensated dismissal”. This illusory and 
incoherent regulation generates several dysfunctions.
First of all, the employee who contests a dismissal cannot apply for a remedy other than reinstate-
ment; he or she is a “passive victim” of unlawful conduct whose interest is protected without bearing his 
or her preferences in mind16. If the dismissal is qualified as wrongful and the employee is not a repre-
sentative, the choice between reinstatement or compensation rests exclusively with the employer. Thus, 
in most cases where the employer opts for readmission, this is done in order to put pressure on the em-
ployee who does not desire to be re-employed (because the relationship has deteriorated in a small en-
terprise, because he or she fears being the victim of harassment, or because he or she has found another 
job…) so that the worker ends up resigning without obtaining the corresponding compensation. It goes 
without saying that this “employer empowerment” scarcely favors the peaceful channelling of conflicts 
in enterprises. It would be more logical that in cases of wrongful dismissal the contractual relation could 
only continue to exist if both parties were to agree; otherwise reinstatement should be replaced with a 
payment sufficient to compensate the damage caused and to discourage future arbitrary dismissals. 
In the event that dismissal is qualified as null and void, the employee must be reinstated even if he 
or she does not want to continue in the position. This situation is not difficult to imagine, given that in 
many of these cases the employer has infringed the employee’s fundamental rights. Article 286.2 of the 
Ley de la Jurisdicción Social (procedural law for Labor Courts) lets the employee opt for compensation 
when the dismissal is voided due to sexual harassment or harassment related to the victim’s gender, but 
this exception does not apply to the other dismissal cases declared null and void. It is only logical that 
the employee should be able to decide between reinstatement and compensation for the unlawful job 
loss. In practice, once again, the employee can use the power that the compulsory reinstatement gives to 
him to agree on a relatively high compensation, but it does not seem that this is an appropriate way to 
peacefully channel conflicts in the employment context.
Secondly, the false predominance of the possibility of reinstatement in the law gives rise to proce-
dural problems generated by rules intended to make this mandatory protection effective. The employee 
has only 20 days to take legal proceedings against dismissals, instead of the deadline of one year that 
works as a general rule; this makes sense if the employee intends to seek reinstatement, but it lacks justi-
fication if what is sought by the employee is solely financial compensation. On the other hand, it is very 
possible that the consideration of reinstatement influenced the traditional prohibition of an accumula-
tion of dismissal claims with any others, regardless of whether the employment relation’s termination 
coincides with legitimate claims for other rights at the same time. The new Ley de la Jurisdicción Social 
extenuates significantly this prohibition of accumulation. Finally, in cases of wrongful dismissal, when 
the employer does not acknowledge compensation within a period of 5 days, it is automatically consid-
ered that he or she has chosen reinstatement, which hardly coincides with reality and thus imposes an 
unnecessary procedure for executing the court’s decision.
In the third place, this symbolical emphasis on an illusory reinstatement obscures the weakness 
of compensation regulation. In most countries, the courts have a certain legal margin to determine the 
compensation amount on a case-by-case basis, although caps are often established. In the Spanish legal 
system, compensation for wrongful dismissal depends exclusively on wages and seniority and not on 
other factors like the firm’s economic capacity, the degree of arbitrariness of the employer’s decision, 
the behaviour of the parties during the conflict and during the process, etc. Today, after the 2012 Reform, 
the general right of perceiving 45 days’ pay per each year of service up to a maximum of 42 months’ 
salary has been decreased to 33 days’ pay per year of service up to a maximum 24 months’ salary. At the 
same time, the so-called “procedural wages” have completely disappeared if the employer opts for the 
severance payment. At the same time, severance payments are established for dismissals with legally 
admissible objective grounds that are also linked to wages and seniority (so that “the cost of the unlaw-
16 Vid., FernánDez lóPez, MªF., “La ejecución forzosa de las sentencias dictadas en los procesos por despido”, RL-I-1991, 
p. 214.
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fulness” to employers is constituted by the difference between these two amounts). Finally, the legal 
sanction that is applicable to the termination of a fraudulent fixed term contract is the presumption that 
the contract of employment is permanent and the termination as wrongful dismissal; the protection in 
strictly legal terms is exactly the same.
In this context, the “despido improcedente” (wrongful or unfair dismissal) has become the nor-
mal channel for the unilateral termination of employment contracts, even when there is a cause. The 
corresponding compensation, totally predictable, is considered by Spanish employers as the economic 
cost of a normal management decision and not as the sanction for an illicit one. This explains employer 
pressures for reductions of wrongful dismissal compensation, leading to progressive reductions in em-
ployees’ protection against arbitrary decisions. 
As a consequence, in the Spanish system it is the seniority of the employee and not the “just cause 
of dismissal” that is the relevant element to determine the protection against dismissal and, thus, the 
effectiveness of the entire content of labor law in the everyday mobilization of labor rights. This causes 
serious dysfunctions in extent to which labor law achieves its purpose of worker “empowerment”, re-
producing labor market segmentation, which is not exclusively determined by the fixed term contracts, 
but rather by the employee’s seniority in the enterprise. While there are a good number of employees 
who are unprotected –to different degrees– from managerial arbitrariness, there may well be a core of 
long-standing “excessively protected” workers; as a result, precarious workers suffer to a large degree 
employer demands for flexibility. Incessant employer demands aimed at the de-regulation of the cause 
for dismissal and the reduction of wrongful or unfair dismissal compensation are progressively decreas-
ing veteran workers’ protection, but, at the same time, these changes are making even more precarious 
the situation of those workers without seniority, who are in a more vulnerable position.
5. Conclusions
Labor and social security law cannot be seen solely as a variety of external disruptions to the func-
tioning of the labour market, but rather must also be seen as having a constitutive role in the configuration of 
the market, typically with a goal of trying to reconcile market efficacy with the satisfaction of the economic 
necessities of society. This latter outcome is principally achieved through the empowerment of workers.
With some nuances, the principal channel through which labour law can influence the re-balanc-
ing of powers between employees and employers is dismissal regulation, which is the most important 
part of labor legislation.
Spanish legislation establishes a system officially based on a just cause for dismissal requirement 
where reinstatement is symbolically claimed as the main remedy for unlawful dismissal; nevertheless, in 
practice, it constitutes a system of “mandatory protection” that rests on employees’ seniority more than 
on just cause for dismissal. This means that a large number of employees do not enjoy the protections 
afforded by labour rules in everyday bargaining surrounding their interests. Moreover, this reality has 
contributed toward the consolidation of employer strategies that are detrimental for productivity. 
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